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Abstract
In the paper, the question whether truth values can be assigned to the propositions before their
verification is discussed. To answer this question, a notion of a propositionally noncontextual
theory is introduced that in order to explain the verification outcomes provides a map linking
each element of a complete lattice identified with a proposition to a truth value. The paper
demonstrates that no model obeying such a theory and at the same time the principle of biva-
lence can be consistent with the occurrence of a non-vanishing “two-path” quantum interference
term and the quantum collapse postulate.
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1 Introduction
As it is known, the presence of contextuality in quantum theory makes it impossible to view a mea-
surement as merely revealing pre-existing properties of a quantum system [1]. More specifically,
no hidden-variable model in quantum theory can assign {0, 1}-valued outcomes to the projections
of the measurement in a way that depends only on the projection and not the context in which it
appeared, even though the Born probabilities associated with those projections are independent of
the context. 1
On the other hand, thanks to a trivial probability function mapping true propositions to probability
1 and false propositions to probability 0, after the assertion of the truth of propositions the sum of
the Born probabilities can be presented as a disjunction of a set of the propositions where exactly
one proposition is true while the others are false. This naturally raises the question whether one
can assign truth values to propositions about properties of a state of a quantum system before the
act of verification. In more general terms, can the assignment of pre-existing truth values to all
the lattice elements associated with the system under investigation be always made available in
quantum theory?
∗Email : arkadyv@bgu.ac.il
1For an overview of different aspects of contextuality in quantum theory and beyond, see [2, 3]. Also, see a review
of the framework of ontological models in [4, 5].
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In this paper, we introduce a notion of a propositionally noncontextual theory, which can provide
a map linking each element of a complete lattice to a truth value so as to explain the verification
outcomes of experimental propositions associated with the state of the system. Using a quantum
version of the double-slit experiment as an example, this paper demonstrates that no model based
on such a theory and at the same time obeying the principle of bivalence can agree with the occur-
rence of a non-vanishing “two-path” quantum interference term and the quantum collapse postulate.
2 Pre-existing truth values and the principle of bivalence
Let us consider a double-slit quantum interference set-up in which detectors placed just behind slits
indicate by a record a particle passage through a particular slit. Let X1 denote the proposition of a
click of the detector behind slit 1 such that X1 is true (“1”) if the detector 1 clicks (verifying in this
way that the particle has indeed passed through slit 1) and X1 is false (“0”) if this detector does
not click (thus verifying that the particle has in fact not passed through slit 1). Let X2 analogously
denote the proposition of the second detector’s click.
Let us introduce the proposition:
X12 ≡ X1 ∨X2 ≡ (X1 ∨X2)∧¬(X1 ∧X2) , (1)
where the symbol ∨ stands for the associative and commutative operation of exclusive disjunction
that outputs true when one of its inputs is true and the other is false. This proposition corresponds
to the assertion that the particle passes through exactly one slit – either 1 or 2. Subsequent to the
recording of which-slit information (i.e., after the detectors confirms the particle’s passage through
either slit), the proposition X12 represents an exact (i.e., sharp) property that the combined system
– i.e., the particle plus the detectors – possesses. 2
To keep things general, let us consider a complete lattice L = (L,⊔,⊓) containing any set L where
each two-element subset {y, z} ⊆ L has a join (i.e., a least upper bound) and a meet (i.e., a greatest
lower bound) defined by y ⊔ z ≡ l.u.b.(y, z) and y ⊓ z ≡ g.l.b.(y, z), correspondingly.
In addition to the binary operations ⊔ and ⊓, let the lattice L contain a unary operation ∼ defined
in a manner that L is closed under this operation and ∼ is an involution, explicitly, ∼y ∈ L if y ∈ L
and ∼(∼y) = y.
Let α(Y ) = [[Y ]]
v
, where Y is any proposition associated with an exact property of the system, refer
to a valuation, i.e., a mapping α : S → VN from a set of propositions S = {Y } to a set VN = {v}
of truth-values v ranging from 0 to 1 where N is the cardinality of {v}.
Let us introduce the following definition: Suppose that there is a homomorphism f : L→ S and let
y ∈ L be a lattice element identified with the proposition Y ∈ S. Then, a theory will be defined as
propositionally noncontextual if to explain (predict) the verification outcomes (i.e., the truth values
2For an approach to unsharp (and partial) forms of a quantum logic, see [6].
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of the proposition Y ) it provides a truth-function v that maps each lattice element to the truth
value of the corresponding proposition, namely, v(y) = [[Y ]]
v
, basing on the following principles:
v(y) = 0 if y = 0L and v(y) = 1 if y = 1L, where 0L is the least and 1L is the greatest elements of
the lattice (identified with always true and always false propositions, respectively).
Correspondingly, a theory, which is not propositionally noncontextual, will be defined as proposi-
tionally contextual. 3
Then, allowing that within a propositionally noncontextual theory the following valuational axioms
hold v(y ⊔ z) = [[Y ∨ Z]]
v
, v(y ⊓ z) = [[Y ∧ Z]]
v
, v(∼ y) = [[¬Y ]]
v
, the truth value of the compound
proposition X12 can be expressed in the lattice-theoretic terms as follows
v(x12) = v
((
⊔2i=1xi
)
⊓
(
∼
(
⊓2i=1xi
)))
= [[X12]]v , (2)
where the lattice elements xi are attributed to the propositions Xi such that v(xi) = [[Xi]]v.
Alternatively, the truth values of logical connectives disjunction, conjunction and negation can be
decided through the corresponding truth degree functions [[Y ∨ Z]]
v
= F∨([[Y ]]v, [[Z]]v), [[Y ∧ Z]]v =
F∧([[Y ]]v, [[Z]]v), and [[¬Y ]]v = F¬([[Y ]]v). For example, in  Lukasiewicz logics, the definition of a
truth degree function of a negation connective F¬ is 1− [[Y ]]v. To meet the  Lukasiewicz version of
negation, we will accept that
v(∼y) = 1− v(y) . (3)
In accordance with this definition, ∼ 0L = 1L and ∼ 1L = 0L meaning that the lattice greatest
element and the lattice least element are complements of each other.
Furthermore, as it is stated in [8],  Lukasiewicz versions of disjunction and conjunction coincide
with the truth-functions of the lattice joins and meets, namely, v(y ⊔ z) = min {v(y) + v(z), 1} and
v(y ⊓ z) = max {v(y) + v(z)− 1, 0}, whenever these  Lukasiewicz operations can be defined.
Now, let us analyze the following assumption: Even before the verification, the lattice elements
xi in the formula (2) can be assigned truth values. Otherwise stated, it is conceivable that the
propositions Xi are in possession of pre-existing (i.e., existing before the detectors’ clicks) truth
values which are either merely revealed or somehow transformed by the verification.
In agreement with the analyzed assumption, let us suppose that before the verification the elements
x1 and x2 are either the bottom element and the top element of a lattice or other way around. In
such a case, prior to the verification, v(⊔2
i=1
xi) = v(0L ⊔ 1L) = 1 while v(⊓
2
i=1
xi) = v(0L ⊓ 1L) = 0,
and therefore, v(x12) = 1 in accordance with the formula (2).
Let P be the probability function mapping any proposition Y,Z, . . . to the real interval [0, 1] such
that P[Y ] = 1 if Y is true, P[Y ] = 0 if Y is false, and P[Y ∨Z] = P [Y ]+P [Z]−P [Y ∧Z]. Along these
3This definition is motivated by a similar one introduced in the paper [7].
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lines, the probability function P can be considered as the degree of belief that the corresponding
proposition is true (or it is expecting to be true). 4
Since in the considered case [[X1 ∨X2]]v = 1 and [[X1 ∧X2]]v = 0, the probability function map-
ping the conjunction X1 ∨X2 to the interval [0, 1] can be written by the sum of the probabilities
P[X1 ∨ X2] = P[X1] + P[X2] = 1. So, were the pre-existing truth values of the propositions X1
and X2 to be such that v(x12) = 1, the interference pattern P[R|X1 ∨ X2] (i.e., the probability
of finding the particle at a certain region R on the screen) in the two-slit set-up with none of the
detectors present at the slits would be the sum of one-slit patterns P[R|X1] and P[R|X2], namely,
P[R|X1∨X2] =
1
2
P[R|X1]+
1
2
P[R|X2] (on condition that P[X1] = P[X2]), and thus the second-order
interference term I12 ≡ P[R|X1 ∨X2]−
1
2
P[R|X1]−
1
2
P[R|X2] would be absent.
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By contrast, let us suppose that before the verification v(x1) = 1 and v(x2) = 1 (which could
be if both xi = 1L) and so, according to the formula (2), v(x12) = 0 prior to the verifica-
tion. But then, one would find – in contradiction to the quantum collapse postulate – that
v(⊓2
i=1
xi) = [[X1 ∧X2]]v = 1, that is, it is not true that only one detector will click if the par-
ticle’s passage through the slits is observed.
Thus, the compound proposition X12 would be in possession of pre-existing truth values (consis-
tent with the occurrence of quantum interference and quantum collapse) only on condition that
v(xi) 6= 0 and v(xi) 6= 1. Clearly, this condition could be met if prior to the verification, X1 and
X2 did not obey the principle “a proposition is either true or false”, i.e., the principle of bivalence.
3 Many-valued logics vs. supervaluationism
From the violation of bivalence, one can infer that results of future non-certain (not consistent with
always true and always false propositions) events can be described using many-valued logics.
For example, in a series of papers [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16], it is argued that for any lattice element
y ∈ L one should have
{v (y)} = {v ∈ R | 0 ≤ v ≤ 1} whereas v(0L) = 0 and v(1L) = 1 , (4)
which implies that an infinite-valued logic should be used to describe not-yet-verified properties of
quantum objects.
But what is more, from the violation of the principle of bivalence it is also possible to conclude
that truth values of the future non-certain events simply do not exist, that is,
{v (y) | y 6= 0L and y 6= 1L} = ∅ whereas v(0L) = 0 and v(1L) = 1 . (5)
4This approach to the generalization of the notion of a probability function allows to accommodate variation in
the background logic of the account while maintaining the core of standard probability theory [9].
5The wording “the second-order interference term” is from [10].
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Unlike the assumption of pre-existing many-valuedness (4) which supposes that borderline (that
is, uncertain) statements should be assigned truth-values lying anywhere between the truth and
the falsehood, the assumption of supervaluationism (5) suggests that such statements should lack
truth-values at all. This can neatly explain why it is impossible to know in advance the truth-values
of the borderline propositions X1 and X2 concerning the path that the particle can take getting
through the slits.
4 Concluding remarks
Suppose a double-slit quantum interference experiment is described in the following manner: After
the verification, the proposition that the particle passes through a particular slit comes out true.
Now, let us ask the question, is this a complete description of the quantum interference experiment?
The first answer is no: In a complete description, the particle passes through either slit regardless
of the verification since any specific proposition about the properties of the combined system (the
particle + the detectors) can be not only either true or false but also neither true nor false. Ac-
cordingly, in the complete description, all the elements of a lattice represent properties which the
system can possess to some degree of truth.
The second answer is yes: Prior to the detectors’ clicks, the particle is by no means has passed
through either slit. If both slits are opened, the passage through the given slit only comes about
when the corresponding detector confirms it. As a result, the sentence “the particle passes through
a particular slit” can be a proposition, that is, a primary bearer of truth-value, only after the
detectors have verified the particle’s passage through the slit. 6
It is clear that the assumption of pre-existing many-valuedness, specifically, infinite-valuedness,
coincides with the first answer. Whereas the assumption of supervaluationism, as per which any
element of a lattice other than the greatest element 1L and the least element 0L carries no truth
values, corresponds to the second answer.
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6One can easily notice that the description of a double-slit interference experiment presented above bears a great
deal of similarity to Einstein’s example of a particle confined to a two-chambered box. See the detailed analysis of
this example in [17].
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